Is There a Cap on Pain and Suffering in D.C.? No, and a $4 Million Verdict Shows Why That Matters
If you have been badly hurt in Washington, D.C., one of the first questions you will ask is the hardest one to answer: what is this worth? Your medical bills and your lost wages can be added up. The rest of it, the pain, the surgeries, the things you can no longer do, has no invoice attached to it.
In the District of Columbia, there is no dollar limit on that part of your case. D.C. has no statutory cap on non-economic damages, in an ordinary injury case or in a medical malpractice case. That is not true in Maryland, and it is only partly true in Virginia. It is one of the few places where District law is meaningfully better for an injured person than the law next door.
A recent decision from the D.C. Court of Appeals shows what that looks like in practice.
What happened to David Kaplan
David Kaplan had severe Crohn's disease. His providers at MedStar Georgetown put him on steroids. Under the national guidelines described at his trial, steroids of that kind are meant to be a three-month bridge, not a long-term treatment, because of what they do to bone. He stayed on them for seven months, more than double the safe window, without being moved to the biologic drugs that were available to him.
The steroids did not control his Crohn's. What they did do was destroy the bone in both of his hips. He needed both hips replaced, which took three surgeries and three long, painful recoveries. He was a young man and, before this, an intense runner. He lost running. He testified about the embarrassment of dating after two hip replacements, and about the limits on how freely he could move through his own life. His sister described watching him nearly break down because he could no longer play tennis with his niece.
A D.C. Superior Court jury found that MedStar had breached the national standard of care and had failed to obtain his informed consent, and awarded him $4 million. MedStar appealed. In MedStar Georgetown Medical Center, Inc. v. Kaplan, No. 24-CV-0942 (D.C. Dec. 18, 2025), the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in full. The decision was first issued as an unpublished memorandum and was then published at Mr. Kaplan's request, which means every injured person in the District can now cite it. You can read it here: MedStar Georgetown Medical Center, Inc. v. Kaplan.
Three things the court decided, and why each one helps injured people
1. Physical injury and emotional harm are two different losses, and a jury can price each one
MedStar's lead argument was that the verdict form invited the jury to pay twice. The form had one line for "Past and Future Physical Injury" and a separate line for "Past and Future Emotional Distress." MedStar said non-economic damages are really one blurry category and should have gotten one line.
The court rejected that. Physical injury and emotional distress, it held, are plainly two distinct concepts even though both are non-economic. The Restatement treats bodily harm and emotional harm separately. So does the standard D.C. jury instruction on damages. And the record here showed two genuinely different injuries: the destroyed hips and the surgeries on one side, the lost running and the shrunken life on the other. The court also noted that the jury awarded different amounts on the two lines, which showed the jurors understood the difference and weighed each one independently.
That matters well beyond this case. In a catastrophic injury or a wrongful death claim, the human losses are usually the largest part of the case, and they are not one undifferentiated lump. What the injury did to your body and what it did to your life can be presented, and paid for, as separate harms.
2. Your lawyer can give the jury a range
MedStar also argued that Mr. Kaplan's closing improperly anchored the jury to $4 million. What his counsel actually said was that some jurors might think the case was worth four million, some three, some six, and that it was completely up to them.
The court held that this is permitted. Under long-standing D.C. precedent, a lawyer may not tell a jury to award one specific number, but may lay out a range and leave the choice to the jury. That is a practical rule with real consequences: a jury in a serious case is not left guessing in a vacuum about the scale of what it is being asked to decide.
3. A large verdict is not "excessive" just because it is large
MedStar's last argument was that $4 million was too much and that the trial judge should have cut it down. The Court of Appeals disagreed and restated the standard: a jury is given great weight on damages, and a verdict is disturbed only if it came from passion, prejudice, mistake, oversight, or improper elements, or is beyond all reason or so great as to shock the conscience.
That is a high bar, and it is the only ceiling the District has. There is no legislature-set number waiting to cut your award down after you win.
How D.C., Maryland, and Virginia compare
| Where the case is | Cap on pain and suffering in an ordinary injury case | Cap in a medical malpractice case | Who applies it |
|---|---|---|---|
| District of Columbia | None | None | The jury sets the number. A judge can cut it only if it shocks the conscience or came from passion, prejudice, or mistake. |
| Maryland | $965,000 (pain and suffering only) for claims arising Oct. 1, 2025 through Sept. 30, 2026, rising $15,000 every Oct. 1; 150 percent of that, or $1,447,500, in a wrongful death case with two or more beneficiaries | $920,000 (pain and suffering only) for claims arising in 2026, rising $15,000 every Jan. 1; 125 percent of that, or $1,150,000, in a wrongful death case with two or more claimants | The judge cuts the verdict down to the cap after trial. The jury is never told the cap exists. |
| Virginia | No cap on pain and suffering (punitive damages are separately capped at $350,000) | $2.75 million for everything combined, medical bills and lost income included, for malpractice occurring July 1, 2026 through June 30, 2027 | The court applies the cap to the judgment after the verdict. |
The Maryland figures rise on a schedule, so the number that applies to your case is fixed by when your claim arose, not by when you file or when you go to trial. Maryland's general cap moves again on October 1. Virginia's malpractice ceiling moves every July 1, and it is a limit on everything combined, so a Virginia malpractice case with large medical bills can run into the cap before pain and suffering is even reached.
None of this is a reason to file in the District if your case does not belong here. Where a case can be brought turns on where the injury happened and who the defendant is. But if your injury or your family member's death happened in D.C., or the hospital or business that caused it is here, the absence of a cap is one of the most valuable features of your claim, and it is worth knowing early.
What to do with this
Two practical points. First, the value of the human side of your case is built from evidence, not adjectives. Mr. Kaplan recovered what he did because the jury heard specifics: the three-month window, the seven months on steroids, the three surgeries, the running, the tennis game with his niece, the sister who watched him almost cry. Keep a record of what your injury has actually taken from you, in that kind of detail, starting now.
Second, D.C. has deadlines that end claims quietly, and a fault rule that can be brutal if you are not ready for it. We have written separately about how long you have to sue in the District and about the contributory negligence rule that decides injury cases in D.C., Maryland, and Virginia. Both are worth reading before you talk to an insurance adjuster.
If you or someone in your family has been seriously injured or killed in the District of Columbia, Maryland, or Virginia, we would be glad to look at it with you. Call Posey Lebowitz PLLC at (202) 524-0123, or use the contact form to set up a free consultation.
This is general information, not legal advice about your case.
Statutes referenced: Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. 11-108; Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. 3-2A-09; Va. Code 8.01-581.15.
