Coalson v. Canchola: Virginia Supreme Court Reinstates Full $100,000 Punitive Award Against Repeat Drunk Driver
When a jury decides that a drunk driver deserves to be punished, should a judge be allowed to cut that punishment in half? Late last month, the Supreme Court of Virginia answered with a firm no.
In Coalson v. Canchola, 287 Va. 242, 754 S.E.2d 525 (Va. Feb. 27, 2014), the Court confronted a fact pattern that captures why punitive damages exist. The defendant was a repeat drunk driver. At the time of the crash he was intoxicated, driving on a suspended license, and using his cell phone. A jury heard the evidence and awarded the injured plaintiff $100,000 in punitive damages — money designed not to compensate, but to punish the defendant and deter others from the same conduct.
The trial court then used a procedure called remittitur to slash the jury's punitive award to $50,000. Remittitur — literally, "it is sent back" — allows a judge who believes a verdict is excessive to order the plaintiff to accept a reduced amount or face a new trial. It exists as a safety valve for runaway verdicts. But a safety valve is not a second opinion: it is not a license for a judge to substitute his own sense of what misconduct deserves for the jury's, when the jury's number is supported by the evidence.
That is essentially what the Supreme Court of Virginia held. The Court reversed and reinstated the jury's full $100,000 award, stressing that punitive awards reflecting the jury's judgment about deterrence and punishment should not be lightly disturbed where the defendant's conduct shows a conscious disregard for the safety of others. On this record — intoxication, a suspended license, a phone in hand, and a history of doing it before — the jury's judgment was anything but arbitrary.
Why punitive damages matter in drunk driving cases
Compensatory damages pay for what was taken from you: medical bills, lost wages, pain, disability. Punitive damages serve a different social function — they are the civil justice system's way of saying that some conduct is so reckless that compensation alone is not enough.
Few categories of conduct fit that description better than repeat drunk driving. A driver who has already been through the system, lost his license, and then chooses to drink, drive, and pick up the phone has demonstrated exactly the "conscious disregard" for others that punitive damages target. Virginia law even includes a specific statute, Va. Code § 8.01-44.5, authorizing punitive damages against intoxicated drivers in defined circumstances, alongside the traditional common-law path the Coalson plaintiff pursued.
Virginia caps punitive damages at $350,000 in any action (Va. Code § 8.01-38.1) — so the $100,000 award here was well within the range the General Assembly has blessed. The question was simply whether the judge or the jury gets the final word within that range. The Supreme Court's answer: when the evidence supports the jury's moral judgment, the jury's number stands.
What this means for injured people in Virginia
- Juries' punishment decisions carry real weight. Coalson is now strong authority that a trial judge cannot casually second-guess a punitive award supported by evidence of egregious conduct. That matters at settlement, too: insurers value cases based on what will survive appeal.
- The drunk driver's history is part of the case. Prior offenses, license suspension, and distraction at the moment of impact were all part of the picture the jury was entitled to weigh. Building that record — through discovery of driving records, criminal files, and phone data — is core trial work.
- Punitive claims change the litigation. A viable punitive count can open discovery into the defendant's conduct and, under the statute, may limit some defense tactics. It also signals to the insurer that a jury will hear the full story, not a sanitized version.
- Contributory negligence remains a threat in Virginia — but a punitive-level case against an intoxicated defendant is one of the settings where the defense's usual leverage weakens considerably.
One more practical note: many drivers assume that liability insurance will simply absorb any award. Punitive damages complicate that assumption — coverage for punitive awards raises its own set of policy and public-policy questions, and defendants facing a punitive count know their personal assets may be in the conversation. That pressure is part of why viable punitive claims resolve differently than ordinary negligence claims.
Drunk driving crashes are not "accidents" in any meaningful sense; they are the predictable result of a choice. The Supreme Court of Virginia has now made clear that when a jury punishes that choice, its verdict deserves respect.
We try drunk driving injury cases throughout Virginia, Maryland, and the District, and we pursue punitive damages whenever the facts support them. If you or a loved one has been hurt, call Posey Lebowitz at (202) 524-0123 or send us a message for a free consultation.
Part of our DMV case law archive, compiled in 2026 to reflect the archive of some of the most important decisions in injury law.
Update: The Supreme Court of Virginia strengthened drunk-driving punitive claims again the following year, holding that juries may not be told punitive damages are “disfavored” — see our coverage of Cain v. Lee.